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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FOURTH AMENDMENT-WARRANT AND
PROBABLE CAUSE REQUIREMENTS-The United States Supreme
Court held that drug urinalysis conducted on student athletes is
constitutional despite a lack of individualized suspicion. The Court
further held that a search, although not contemplated by the
Framers of the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, may be reasonable if on balance the governmental
interest it serves outweighs the legitimate privacy interests of its
subjects.
Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995).
Vernonia, Oregon is a community of about 3000 inhabitants
where school district activities, especially interscholastic athletics,
occupy a prominent position in town life.' The Vernonia School
District (the "District") is comprised of three grade schools and
Vernonia High School.2 The majority of the District's students
participate in athletics.' These student athletes enjoy the
attention and admiration of the community.'
Historically, student behavior in class and at school-sponsored
activities had been noted as cooperative and respectful.' Drug and
alcohol use was perceived as confined to a limited "fringe" of the
student population.' However, between 1985 and 1989 teachers
and administrators observed a significant increase in disciplinary
problems, including drug and alcohol use.7 Athletic coaches
became concerned that drug and alcohol use was compromising
the safety of athletes.' Teachers witnessed rudeness, profanity
1. Acton v. Vernonia School District 47J, 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1356 (D. Or.
1992), rev'd, 23 F.3d 1514 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995).
2. Acton v. Vernonia School District 47J, 23 F.3d 1514, 1516 (9th Cir. 1994),
rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995).
3. Vernonia, 796 F. Supp. at 1356. Sixty to sixty-five percent of high school
students and seventy to seventy-five percent of grade school students participated in




7. Vernonia, 23 F.3d at 1516.
8. Id. One wrestler was injured after failing to execute a basic maneuver. Id.
The coach reported that the student's hotel room smelled of marijuana when the coach
went to check on the student's condition. Id.
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and blatant espousal of drug use in class, but often felt helpless
to curtail such behavior.9
School officials believed that the deteriorating disciplinary
situation was the result of substance abuse.'" Students were not
especially secretive about their drug use, indeed, they flaunted it,
openly challenging the school's power over them." The District's
leading athletes were viewed as leaders of the unruly students.'
The District considered "corruption" of these influential members
of the student body particularly troublesome. 3
Initially, the District attempted to combat the drug problem
through educational programs."' The District held special classes
on the hazards of drug use. 5 Special speakers, seminars, and
theatrical presentations were employed and drug-sniffing dogs
visited the school.'6 However, none of these measures achieved
the desired deterrent effect.
7
A meeting was held with the District's parents to discuss drug
testing as a solution to the troublesome student behavior." A
drug testing plan was presented at a meeting held for the
District's parents and was approved by a unanimous vote of those
in attendance. 9 The Student Athlete Drug Policy (the "Policy")
was approved by the Vernonia School Board for implementation
in the Fall of 1989.20
Under the Policy, all students had to submit authorization
forms signed by the students and their parents as a prerequisite
9. Vernonia, 796 F. Supp. at 1356. An English teacher received several essays
portraying drug and alcohol use by students. Vernonia, 23 F.3d at 1516. A faculty
member with fifteen years of service expressed an inclination to leave the school due
to frustration with the changed circumstances of her classroom. Vernonia, 796 F. Supp.
at 1356.
10. Vernonia, 796 F. Supp. at 1357.
11. Id. at 1356.
12. Id. at 1357. The District's views were formed, in part, through comments
elicited from parents and certain "responsible students." Id.
13. Id. The district court judge found: "[T]he very center of activity of the school
and community was endangered." Id.
14. Id.
15. Vernonia, 796 F. Supp. at 1357.
16. Id.
17. Id. The day following a play depicting the perils of drug abuse, several
athletes were arrested for using intoxicants at a party held during school hours. Id.
18. Id. at 1358. The school was described as in a state of "open revolt" with
student athletes considered central to the conflict. Id.
19. Id. Drug testing had been considered previously but rejected, in part, due
to doubts about its legality. I&i
20. Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2389 (1995). The ex-
pressed purpose of the Policy was "to prevent student athletes from using drugs, to
protect their health and safety, and to provide drug users with assistance programs."
Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2389.
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to participation in interscholastic sports.2 Every student athlete
was tested for drugs at the beginning of the season for the sport
in which the athlete was to participate.22 In addition, students
were chosen from a pool of all participants for random testing.2
Specimen collection was conducted by faculty members, and an
independent laboratory conducted the tests and informed
authorized administrators of the results.2 ' Testing was limited to
evidence of drug and alcohol use and positive test results were
confirmed by a prompt second test.25 Upon confirmation of a
positive result, the student and parents were summoned to meet
with the school principal and disciplinary action was
determined.5
As a seventh grader in the Fall of 1991, James Acton ("Acton")
wanted to participate in his grade school's District-sponsored
27football program. Upon his parents' refusal to sign a form
authorizing a drug urinalysis, the District refused to permit him
to participate. 2s Thereafter, Acton's parents filed suit in the
United States District Court for the District of Oregon seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief based on the claim that the
District's testing policy violated Acton's rights under the Fourth
21. Id
22. Id.
23. Id. Roughly ten percent of student athletes were tested each week. Id.
24. Id. Test subjects first completed a specimen control form bearing a number
for anonymous testing identification. Id. The Policy required disclosure, on the form,
of all prescription medication the student was taking and authorization for any
prescription medication. Id. Males filled sample cups at urinals with monitors standing
a short distance behind to watch and listen for tampering. Id. Females produced sam-
ples inside stalls with monitors outside listening for sounds of tampering. Id. The
monitors collected the sample cups, checked the samples' temperatures, and transferred
the samples to vials for laboratory analysis. Id. Strict chain of custody procedures were
followed, lab tests were conducted anonymously, and access to test results was limited
to the superintendent, principals, vice-principals, and coaches. Id.
25. Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2390. Laboratory procedures were 99.94% accurate.
Id. at 2389. Each sample was routinely tested for amphetamines, cocaine, and mari-
juana, and the District retained an option to test for additional substances. Id. Results
were kept for one year. Id.
26. Id at 2390. First offenders could either submit to a six-week -assistance
program involving weekly urinalysis or accept a suspension for the balance of the
athletic season and the next season. Id. A second offense resulted in automatic





Amendment to the United States Constitution" and article 1,
section 9 of the Oregon Constitution."
In a bench trial, the district court determined that the
mandatory and random drug testing conducted by the District was
a reasonable search as permitted by the Fourth Amendment and
the Oregon Constitution.31 The court considered that in order for
the search to be reasonable, it must meet a compelling
governmental need. 2 The court found that the District's aims of
addressing athletic safety concerns and the maintenance of order
in classrooms necessitated the search procedure at issue."
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed the trial court, finding the District's goals proper,
but not sufficiently compelling to permit "suspicionless"
searches.' Furthermore, the court of appeals faulted the district
court for not giving due weight to the privacy interests of the
affected students.35
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari0 to
determine whether the random drug testing was violative of the
Fourth Amendment. 7 The Court began its consideration of the
case by reaffirming that the District Policy was a "search" as that
term is used in the Fourth Amendment. 8 The Court recognized
29. Id. The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing . --the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
30. Vernonia, 796 F. Supp. at 1354. The Oregon Constitution states:
No law shall violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure; and no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath, or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to
be seized.
OR. CONST. art. I, § 9.
31. Vernonia, 796 F. Supp. at 1365-67.
32. Id. at 1363.
33. Id.
34. Vernonia, 23 F.3d at 1526-27. The court argued that the Fourth Amendment
is not to be molded to fit the exigencies of the moment, but rather, it often requires
some tolerance of social turmoil and discomfort to preserve its integrity and purpose.
Id. at 1527.
35. Id. at 1525.
36. Certiorari is a common law writ issued by a superior to an inferior court
requiring the production of a certified record of a case tried in the inferior court.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 228 (6th ed. 1990).
37. Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2388. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the
Court in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, and
Breyer joined. Id.
38. Id. at 2390 (citing Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n-, 489 U.S. 602,
1170 Vol. 34:1167
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that the reasonableness of an intrusion complained of is not to be
determined solely by reference to the Warrant Clause of the
Fourth Amendment. 9 The Court noted that reasonableness, as
determined by examining the special governmental needs of public
schools in light of the legitimate privacy expectations of the
students affected, was the standard to be employed in assessing
the constitutionality of the Policy.'
To facilitate balancing these competing factors, the Court first
attempted to quantify the interests at stake." The Court noted
that only privacy expectations that are legitimate are relevant and
these vary with the context of an action and the relationship of an
individual to the state. 2 School children, the Court observed, are
subject to parental control over their freedom of movement and,
this authority is delegated to school officials by the parents.'
The relationship of school officials to their students, the Court
stated, is a custodial one in which the officials are responsible for
the welfare and intellectual development of their charges." The
Court recognized that school officials, as state actors, are
constrained by the Constitution, but only to the extent appropriate
in the school setting.' The Court also noted that school children
are subjected to mandatory physical examinations, vaccinations
and other tests designed to promote their general welfare.' The
majority cited these facts in support of the view that school
children, in general, have a lower expectation of privacy than
society at large. 7 As to athletes, the Court perceived even less
expectation of physical privacy because they typically change
617 (1989) (holding that tests conducted on urine or blood to detect drug or alcohol
use are searches subject to the Fourth Amendment)).
39. Id. at 2391. The Warrant Clause provides: "[N]o Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
See supra note 29 for the full text of the Fourth Amendment.
40. Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2390. The Court stated that searches of a sort not
practiced when the Fourth Amendment was adopted must meet a standard of
reasonableness judged by a balancing of the personal and public interests implicated.
Id,
41. Id. at 2391-95.
42. Id. at 2391.
43. Id.
44. Id. The Court considered the relationship of school officials to students
central to its decision. Id. The Court framed the relevant inquiry as "whether the
search is one that a reasonable guardian and tutor might undertake." Id at 2397.
45. Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2392. The Court noted that school officials can






clothes and shower in common areas."8 Further, the Court stated
that athletes voluntarily submit to rules and regulations
concerning dress, practice times, and academic performance. 9
The Court took notice of the fact that elimination is a body
function typically afforded great privacy." However, the testing
process struck the Court as substantively no different than the
use of a public restroom.1 Because school children presumably
use such public facilities, the Court viewed the practice of
compelling students to provide urine samples in the presence of
a faculty member as a "negligible" intrusion on the students'
privacies.5 2
The other privacy-invasive aspect of the Policy that the Court
considered was the potential disclosure of personal information.53
The Court noted in this regard that the urine samples were
screened only for the presence of drugs.' Disclosure of
prescription medications on the specimen control form was a
legitimate concern, the Court allowed, but not one sufficient to
persuade the Court that the Policy was unreasonable."5
The Court disagreed with the district court's view that the
reasonableness of the Policy was dependent on the compelling
nature of its underlying purpose. 5 Rather, the Court held that
the Policy must merely be important enough to justify the action
taken. 7 The Court expressed no doubt that deterrence of drug
use is a strong social need and that it is of particular interest to
48. Id. at 2392-93.
49. Id. at 2393. The Court stated that the privacy expectations of student
athletes are similar to those of employees in "closely regulated industrfies]." Id. See
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 627 (1989) (holding that
railroad employees have less expectation of privacy than a typical person by virtue of
their participation in an industry subject to extensive governmental regulation).
50. Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2393.
51. Id. Male students provided samples at urinals while fully clothed and
observed only from the rear. Id
52. Id.
53. Id. at 2393-94. The Court noted that urine testing can disclose what the
subject has ingested and information about the body such as whether the person is
pregnant, diabetic, or epileptic. Id. at 2393.
54. Id. at 2393. The Court distinguished this examination from an "evidentiary
search," which the Court generally permits only upon probable cause, in that it is
conducted for "nonpunitive purposes." Id. at 2393 n.2. The Court's characterization was
not affected by the students' perception that searches were disciplinary sanctions. Id.
The Court insisted that, in consideration of the district court's finding that the search
was "prophylactic," the students' views were "irrational" and of no legal significance.
Id.





educators in their efforts to promote the physical, intellectual and
moral growth of their students. 8
The Court viewed the Policy's focus on athletes as important in
assessing the constitutionality of the scheme. 9 The Court found
that drug use by athletes carries the risk of physical injury."'
Because District athletes were conspicuous among the
unmanageable students and were considered role models in the
community, the Court approved targeting that segment of the
student body as calculated to have an effect throughout the
school."'
The Court considered that the intractability of the students
made it incumbent upon the District to act decisively and, the
Court declared, the District did not have to choose the least
intrusive means available. 2 The Court indicated several virtues
of mandatory random drug testing of athletes. 3 First, the Court
noted, the Policy's mandatory application to all student athletes
removed discretion from administrators, thus constraining them
from targeting individuals arbitrarily." Furthermore, the Court
stated, because faculty members had no role in deciding whom to
test, mandatory testing did not distract faculty members from
their other duties.' Finally, the Court's analysis revealed that
blanket testing is the surest means to detect illicit drug use in
each individual.66
From the foregoing the Court concluded that the Policy was a
reasonable means to maintain order in the school and reduce the
possibility of drug-related athletic injuries. 7 Accordingly, the
Court vacated the judgment of the Ninth Circuit."
58. Id. at 2395.
59. Id.
60. Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2395. Testimony showed that certain chemicals
reduce pain perception, suppress fatigue, cause abnormal blood pressure, slow response
time, and pose cardiac risks. Id.
61. Id. at 2395-96. The Court found that this "role-model effect" was exacer-
bating the drug problem and that drugs were inextricably connected to the decaying
disciplinary atmosphere in the school. Id,
62. Id. at 2396.
63. Id.
64. Id. The Court also noted that this scheme undercut individual protests alleg-
ing unfair treatment, thus removing a potential obstacle to the smooth operation of
the Policy. Id.
65. Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2396.
66. Id. at 2395-96.
67. Id. at 2396.
68. Id- at 2397. The Court declined to quarrel with the endorsement of the
Policy by the School Board, the District, parents, and the district court. Id
1996 1173
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Justice Ginsburg filed an opinion explicating her grounds for
joining in the decision of the majority.69 Justice Ginsburg
understood the decision to be limited to the particular facts before
the Court and sanctioned no more reprisal for a positive drug test
than suspension from interscholastic sports.0
A lengthy dissent authored by Justice O'Connor asserted that
the majority opinion reflected the improper policy decision that it
is better to test broadly and without exception than to do so only
when an individual is suspected of using illegal drugs.7 This
approach, the dissent claimed, wrongly avoids the true nature of
the privacy issue at stake.72
The dissent explored the history of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence to demonstrate the majority's understatement of the
gravity of discarding individual cause as a prerequisite to a
constitutionally reasonable search. 7' The dissent reminded the
majority that reasonableness, as envisioned by the Framers of the
Fourth Amendment, necessarily included an element of
justification for each individual intrusion of a citizen's rights.74
The dissent distinguished the instances when the Court had
dispensed with a requirement of individual suspicion by asserting
that those exceptions were motivated by the grave consequences
inherent in a failure to detect the object of the search75 and the
absence of an alternate means of addressing the need.7 The
majority erred, the dissent maintained, in considering
69. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
70. Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2397.
71. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justices Stevens and Souter joined in the
dissent. Id. The majority preferred the blanket scheme because in a suspicionless
search no individual can complain of unjustifiable testing because no accusation was
implicit in the test. Id. at 2397-98.
72. Id. at 2397-98.
73. Id. at 2398-400. Justice O'Connor rejected the proposition that a search could
be made reasonable by expanding its scope to include all of a particular class. Id. at
2398.
74. Id. at 2398 (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (holding a
warrant dispensable when impractical to obtain and when an officer conducting a
search can demonstrate probable cause)). The dissent stated that the requirement that
each individual search be based on demonstrable suspicion of the individual is pre-
servative of personal liberty in that it minimizes the number of people who must
suffer intrusion and also guards the integrity and free will of the populace by allowing
them to avoid such intrusions by refraining from the objectionable conduct. Id.
75. Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2402. The dissent noted that exceptions have been
recognized to prevent airline hijackings, rail disasters, compromise of international
borders, and residential fires. Id.
76. Id. at 2403. The dissent indicated that there was ample anecdotal evidence
in the record demonstrating numerous occasions for suspicion of particular individuals
on which to base a decision to test. Id Students were observed smoking a marijuana
cigarette at a nearby restaurant, students appeared inebriated in class, and a hotel
room occupied by four wrestlers smelled of marijuana. Id.
1174 Vol. 34:1167
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suspicionless searches as a "level alternative" to a suspicion-based
regime to be chosen by comparing the relative practicality and
ease of execution.77
The dissent did not deny the importance of addressing a drug
problem within a school, nor the assertion that school
administrators enjoy more latitude under the Constitution than
law enforcement officers, but the dissent refused to condone
stripping students of at least minimal protection from personally
intrusive searches.78 In the dissent's view, the District's choice of
athletes as subjects of the Policy was based on pretense calculated
to pass judicial scrutiny.7" No persuasive reason was seen by the
dissent to supplant the existing accusatory disciplinary scheme in
the school for only a selective portion of students in the hopes of
affecting the whole student body. 0 In sum, the dissent found the
Policy too indirect and unjustifiably broad to be considered
constitutionally permissible."1
The United States Supreme Court, in Camara v. Municipal
Court,2  stated that the "basic purpose" of the Fourth
Amendment is to protect the "privacy and security of individuals
against arbitrary invasions by government officials."' This
protection, the Court stated, takes the form of a prohibition on
unreasonable searches or seizures of an individual's person,
property, papers, or effects." The Court further stated that
except in a well-defined class of cases, a search not consented to
is unreasonable when not conducted under the authority of a valid
search warrant. 5  The Court observed that the Fourth
Amendment commands that warrants shall not be issued without
probable cause. 8
In Camara, the Court dealt with a challenge to the
constitutionality of a provision of the San Francisco Housing Code
(the "Code").87 Camara was arrested for refusing to permit an
77. Id.
78. Id. at 2404.
79. Id. at 2406. The dissent opined that the evidence of drug-related athletic
injuries was nearly non-existent and belies a true motivation to make examples of a
vulnerable class of students while preserving the appearance of a choice to be tested
by not threatening a student's right to receive an education. Id. at 2402.
80. Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2402.
81. Id. at 2407.
82. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
83. Camara, 387 U.S. at 528.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 528-29.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 525-26. Camara's challenge was in the form of a petition to the
Superior Court of California for a writ of prohibition to the criminal court in which
he was awaiting trial on a criminal charge. Id. at 525. The charge stemmed from
1996 1175
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inspection of his residence as prescribed in the Code to ensure
compliance with the Code."8 Camara contended that the
authorized inspections were unconstitutional because they were
conducted without a warrant and without probable cause."
In Camara the Court reformulated the meaning of probable
cause.9° Although the Court insisted that a warrant and probable
cause are still necessary, the Court determined that the measure
of reasonableness for a search by an administrative officer varies
from that applied in the criminal context. 1 The Court identified
reasonableness as the ultimate measure of a search's
constitutionality, and what is reasonable varies with the object
and the public need it serves.9 2 The Court stated that when the
object of a search is to uncover evidence of a crime, it is
reasonable only when probable cause exists to believe it would be
found in the particular place to be searched.93 The Court
considered that probable cause for a search for conditions in
structures that pose a threat to the health and safety of those in
the community have to be examined in light of the purposes of the
search.94 The Court sanctioned balancing the competing public
and private interests at stake to determine the reasonableness of
a search." The Court recognized that dangerous structural
conditions, such as faulty wiring, often develop unintentionally,
Camara's refusal to permit a warrantless search of his residence by an inspector of
the Division of Housing Inspection of the San Francisco Department of Public Health.
Id. at 525-26.
88. Camara, 387 U.S. at 525-26. The Code granted employees of city
departments or agencies the right to enter any "building, structure, or premises" when
necessary to perform the duties imposed on them by the San Francisco Municipal
Code. Id. at 526.
89. Id. at 527. The Court agreed with Camara that a warrant was required be-
fore his home could be entered by government agents. Id. at 534. The Court first
rejected the notion that statutory authority is sufficient to establish the reasonableness
of a search. Id. at 532. The Court contended that a primary purpose of a warrant is
to assure the resident that the officer executing the warrant has proper authorization
and justification to search. Id. A warrant serves this purpose by removing the final
decision on reasonableness of the search from the discretion of a field officer and plac-
ing it in the hands of a neutral magistrate. Id. The Court expressly provided that a
warrantless search cannot be justified by the public need it serves alone or the
reasonableness of the statute which authorizes it. Id. at 533. The opinion stated that
a warrant may only be dispensed with when the process of obtaining it would
frustrate the purpose of the search. Id.
90. Id. at 534-39.
91. Id. at 535.
92. Id. at 538-39.
93. Camara, 387 U.S. at 535. The Court stated that a search for particular
stolen goods, for example, would not justify a sweeping search of a community with
the hope that the stolen goods would be found. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 536-37.
1176
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are frequently unobservable from the exterior and often are
unknown to the occupants of the structure." Furthermore, the
Court noted that the only effective way to detect and deter the
development of dangerous conditions is through periodic area-wide
inspections.97 The Court reasoned that insisting on the presence
of probable cause to believe violations of the Code will be found in
a particular structure before an inspection can proceed would
defeat the purpose of the inspection.8 The Court concluded that
area-wide searches were necessary to the enforcement of the Code
and that the invasion of privacy was relatively limited.' The
Court stressed that the inspections were not directed at
uncovering criminal activity, nor were the inspections of a
personal nature, but rather the searches were directed at the
buildings themselves."o In balancing the competing interests,
the Court held that if a valid public interest justifies a proposed
governmental intrusion then probable cause exists to issue a
warrant to conduct a search.101
In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,0' the Court examined
permanent checkpoints set up by the United States Border Patrol
on major highways leading away from the Mexican border.'
The Court considered whether these tactics could be employed
constitutionally to stop and question each car as to the residency
of its occupants without any articulable suspicion that any car
passing contained illegal aliens."' The Court explained that the
suspicionless stops by the Border Patrol were constitutional
because the important governmental objective they served
outweighed the minimal privacy interests they infringed, and that
objective would be jeopardized by a requirement of individualized
suspicion.0" The Court defended its novel approval of a seizure
96. Id. at 537.
97. Id. at 535-36.
98. Camara, 387 U.S. at 536-37.
99. Id. at 537.
100. Id. The Court was careful to state that the Fourth Amendment is just as
applicable in a regulatory as in a criminal context. Id. at 530-31. The Court held only
that the measure of a reasonable justification for a warrant increases according to the
potential legal consequences of a search. Id. at 537-38.
101. Id. at 539.
102. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
103. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 545-46. Such inland stops are considered neces-
sary in enforcing United States immigration quotas because efforts at the border are
insufficient. Id. at 551. Large numbers of aliens elude border patrols along the 2,000
miles of mostly arid, uninhabited desert that forms the United States-Mexico border,
so inland efforts were aimed at preventing highways from becoming "quick and safe
route[s] to the interior." Id. at 552, 556-57.
104. Id. at 562.
105. Id. at 556-62. The Court looked to a prior decision, in which it held that a
1996 1177
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without individualized suspicion by noting the impracticality of
studying each car in an unimpeded traffic flow."6 The Court also
emphasized that the routine nature of these stops limited the
discretion of officers in the field and reduced the fear or surprise
associated with stops by roving patrols.
1 7
In New York v. Burger,' the State of New York appealed the
decision of the New York Court of Appeals which held that a
statute authorizing warrantless administrative inspections of
automobile junkyards is unconstitutional."° Burger was the
operator of a junkyard who had been charged with possession of
stolen property based on a search of his premises conducted by
officers of the New York City Police Department pursuant to the
New York statute at issue."0 The New York Court of Appeals
invalidated the search, concluding that the inspection was not
conducted merely to enforce a valid regulatory scheme, but rather
to uncover evidence of criminal activity."'
In Burger, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider
whether warrantless searches conducted as part of a pervasive
regulatory scheme for a particular industry are unconstitutional
because the searches are directed at deterring and detecting
criminal activity."' The Court stated that individuals have less
expectation of privacy in commercial property than in private
homes and that those participating in industries subject to close
governmental regulation have even less expectation of privacy
than proprietors in general.' The Court held that, because of
Border Patrol officer could stop a vehicle upon reasonable suspicion that it contained
illegal aliens, as authority for subjecting such stops to "less stringent constitutional
safeguards." Id. at 555 (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884
(1975) (holding that roving Border Patrol officers could stop vehicles if they possessed
articulable facts which warranted a reasonable suspicion that a specific vehicle
contained aliens illegally present in the United States)).
106. Id. at 557. The Court also considered that any deterrent effect of the
checkpoints would be thwarted by a requirement of individualized suspicion due to the
ability of experienced smugglers to disguise their operations. Id.
107. Id. at 559. The Court had previously considered that leaving the decision of
when and whom to stop to the discretion of a field officer created an unreasonable
potential for abuse. See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 882-83.
108. 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
109. Burger, 482 U.S. at 697-98.
110. Id. at 693-95. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 415-a (McKinney 1986)
(requiring participants in the vehicle dismantling industry to register as such, maintain
records demonstrating ownership and disposition of vehicles and parts passing through
the business' possession, and requiring production of records and inventory for
inspection by state officers).
111. Burger v. New York, 493 N.E.2d 926 (N.Y. 1986), rev'd, 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
112. Burger, 482 U.S. at 693, 698.
113. Id. at 700 (citing United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (upholding
a warrantless search of a pawnshop licensed to sell guns pursuant to the Gun Control
1178 Vol. 34:1167
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the reduced expectation of privacy possessed by participants in a
closely-regulated industry, neither probable cause nor a warrant
are required for a constitutionally reasonable governmental search
of commercial property."' The Court deemed warrantless
searches reasonable in this context if three criteria are met: 1) the
inspection must serve a "substantial government interest;" 2) the
inspection must be necessary to further that interest; and 3) the
authorizing statute must adequately apprise the owner of the
premises that the property is lawfully subject to such searches
and the statute must limit the discretion of the executing officer
in the time, place, and scope of the search."5
In Griffin v. Wisconsin," the Supreme Court considered
whether the search of a probationer's home by probation officers
acting without a warrant or probable cause to believe contraband
would be found is a reasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment.117 Griffin was on probation when officers of the
Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services discovered
a gun in his home.' Regulations of the Wisconsin State
Department of Health and Social Services, which oversees
probationers, provide that its officers may search a probationer's
home without a warrant with the approval of a supervisor and
"reasonable grounds" to believe prohibited items are present."
The Supreme Court found the search in Griffin to be reasonable
based on the consideration that the regulation authorizing the
search is itself reasonable under Fourth Amendment
principles."2  The Court found that the regulation serves a
Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-928 (1988))). In Biswell, the Court observed: "When a
dealer chooses to engage in this pervasively regulated business and to accept a federal
license, he does so with the knowledge that his business records, firearms, and
ammunition will be subject to effective inspection." Id. at 701 (quoting Biswell, 406
U.S. at 316).
114. Id. at 702.
115. Id. at 702-03. Frequent, warrantless inspections were found by the Court to
contain an element of "surprise" which serves as a valuable deterrent to the traffic in
stolen goods, the prevention of which was the basis for the regulation. Id. at 710.
116. 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
117. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 870-72.
118. Id at 870. Griffin was on probation for resisting arrest, disorderly conduct,
and obstructing an officer. Id. Griffin had also previously been convicted of a felony
and therefore was found guilty of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and
sentenced to two years in prison. Id. at 872. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed
the trial court's denial of Griffin's suppression motion concerning the search of his
home, holding that by virtue of his probation Griffin had a lowered expectation of
privacy and that a warrantless search based on "reasonable grounds" to believe he had
a gun was sufficient for Fourth Amendment purposes. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 388 N.W.2d
535 (Wis. 1986), affd, 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
119. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 870-71. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 973.10(1) (1985).
120. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873.
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"special need" of state government that extends beyond typical law
enforcement.' The Court recognized that probation is a form of
state custody which represents but one choice of several possible
sentences for conviction of a criminal offense. 22 The Court
further noted that probation entails close supervision to ensure
compliance with its terms.2
The Court's analysis did not end with a finding that probation
is a special need of states.'24 To justify waiving a warrant and
probable cause as prerequisites to a constitutional search, the
Court stated that these requirements must have been
"impracticable."2' The Court decided that this test had been
met, explaining that the interposition of a judge into the probation
system would make it more difficult for a probation officer to
tailor supervision to a particular client's situation. 2 '
Furthermore, the Court indicated that the practice serves a
valuable deterrent effect.'27 The Court viewed probable cause as
equally problematic for the proper functioning of the probation
system. 2 ' The Court determined that the supervisory
relationship established by the probation system calls for a
measure of curtailment of the probationer's right to privacy
121. Id. at 873-74. The Court listed as examples of areas of "special need" the
operation of schools, government offices, prisons and regulation of certain industries.
Id.
122. Id. at 874. The Court noted that probation is not a fixed punishment, but
rather consists of conditions and restrictions which, if violated, can result in
incarceration. Id. This circumstance was characterized by the Court as "conditional
liberty" as distinguished from the "absolute liberty" enjoyed by other citizens. Id.
123. Id. at 875. The Court opined that this serves the dual purpose of safe-
guarding the public from the inherent danger posed by known felons and a reduction
in recidivism which research suggests is a product of intense supervision. Id.
124. Id. at 875-79.
125. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 875-76. The Court borrowed Justice Blackmun's formula-
tion that exceptions are permitted to the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment when "special needs beyond the normal need for law enforcement make
the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable." Id. at 873 (quoting New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (holding that, in the
context of public schools, warrantless searches could be conducted upon a degree of
suspicion less than probable cause)).
126. Id. at 876. The Court analogized the situation to requiring a parent to seek
judicial permission to search a child's room. Id. The Court viewed the probation officer
as an adequate guardian of the probationer's interests because the job is designed to
benefit the probationer through rehabilitation and thus is not entirely adversarial. Id.
at 876-77.
127. Id. at 876.
128. Id. at 878-79. The Court emphasized the ongoing supervisory relationship
and its non-adversarial aspect in concluding that a probable-cause standard is too
inflexible to accommodate the value of the subjective knowledge of individual "clients"
as well as the professional experience of probation officers in assessing the need for
a search. Id.
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beyond that permitted in the states' relationships with the general
populace.'
In 1989, in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n,3 ° the
Court applied a balancing of interests approach in its Fourth
Amendment analysis of whether railroads, as mandated by
Federal Railroad Administration ("FRA") regulations, 131 can
require drug and alcohol testing of all workers employed in safety-
sensitive positions 3' that are involved in certain train accidents,
without suspicion of individual intoxication or fault in the
accident."'
The FRA promulgated regulations requiring railroads to enforce
an industry-wide prohibition on drug and alcohol use on the
job."M This mandate was developed in response to FRA findings
that inebriation on the job was a prevalent and long-standing
problem among railroad employees,"3 a substantial number of
fatal and costly train accidents were directly or partly attributable
to drug or alcohol impairment..6 and industry reliance on
observation by supervisors and co-workers to enforce the
prohibition on such intoxication was a failure.'37
In prelude to examination of the issue, the Court affirmed that
urine testing implicates Fourth Amendment privacy interests."
129. Id. at 875.
130. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
131. See 49 C.F.R. §§ 219.1-.905 (1994) (mandating that railroads collect blood
and urine samples for toxicological testing from all employees involved in accidents of
a specified level of severity).
132. Safety sensitive positions are defined by the Hours of Service Act of 1907,
ch. 2939, 34 Stat. 1415 (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 61-66 (1988)).
133. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 606, 619.
134. Id. at 606. See 49 C.F.R. § 219.101 (proscribing drug and alcohol possession
and intoxication at work). Under the regulations, railroads are required to provide
blood and urine samples of all covered employees involved in certain train accidents
or incidents. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 609.
135. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 606, 607 & n.1.
136. Id. at 607. According to the FRA, drug and alcohol use was a likely
contributing factor in seventeen employee fatalities and twenty-one train accidents
resulting in twenty-one deaths, sixty-one non-fatal injuries and an estimated twenty-
seven million dollars in property damage. Id. (citing 48 Fed. Reg. 30726 (1983)).
137. Id. at 607-08. The issue as to the constitutionality of this scheme, which
does not require suspicion that an individual is inebriated, was raised by the Railway
Labor Executives' Association and its affiliated labor organizations. Id. at 612. The
issue came before the Supreme Court after a decision, by a divided vote of the Ninth
Circuit, that although the urgency of promptly obtaining evidence of impairment
justifies dispensing with the issuance of a warrant, proper respect due the privacy
interests of railroad employees dictates insistence on probable cause to suspect that
an individual is impaired for drug-testing of body fluids to be reasonable as required
by the Fourth Amendment. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575,
583, 587 (9th Cir. 1988), rev'd sub nom. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n,
489 U.S. 602 (1989).
138. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616-17. The Court found that urine testing reveals
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For the Court, the consideration of the reasonableness of these
warrantless searches was justified by the Court's determination
that the regulations at issue, designed for the purpose of ensuring
railroad safety, put the searches in a class serving "special needs,"
which render the requirements of a warrant and probable cause
unnecessary when unworkable.13
The Court proceeded in its evaluation from the premise that
there are circumstances in which an individual's Fourth
Amendment rights must bow to an overriding governmental
concern."4 The Court concluded that because the government
has a compelling interest in preventing accidents which would be
jeopardized if individualized suspicion was required, 4' and
because railroad employees have this reduced expectation of
privacy, the tests are a reasonable means of detecting and
deterring on-the-job intoxication.'
Conceding that a governmental interest in preventing rail
accidents is compelling and that insistence on individualized
suspicion would threaten the very goals of the tests, the Court's
determination of the constitutionality of the FRA's scheme turned
on whether the tests amounted to only a minimal intrusion on the
employees' rights." The Court expressed legitimate concern
private medical information about an employee and intrudes on a very personal and
private body function. Id. at 617.
139. Id. at 619 (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985)
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (holding that searches conducted by school authorities are
an exception to the warrant and probable cause elements of the Fourth Amendment)).
In Skinner, the Court found the warrant requirement unwieldy and impractical because
the delay occasioned by procuring a warrant could result in the loss of invaluable evi-
dence. Id. at 623. A requirement of probable cause, the Court decided, would endanger
the purpose of the tests partly because the confusion ensuing in the wake of a train
accident is hardly conducive to the observation and reflection necessary to develop a
suspicion that a particular employee is impaired or that an employee's possible
impairment may have contributed to the mishap. Id. at 631.
140. 1d at 624. The Court referred to "limited circumstances, where the privacy
interests implicated by the search are minimal, and where an important governmental
interest furthered by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of
individualized suspicion, a search may be reasonable despite the absence of such
suspicion." Id.
141. Id at 633. The Court stated: "[The gravamen of the evil is performing cer-
tain functions while concealing the substance in the body." Id. The Court stated that
railroad experience showed that the dismissal sanction for intoxication was not an
adequate deterrent unless employees believed it was likely their substance abuse would
be uncovered, Id. at 629-30. The Court found that the unpredictability of the event
setting the process in motion (a train wreck) significantly enhances this deterrent
effect. Id. at 630.
142. Id. at 633.
143. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624-31. The Court noted that employees subject to
testing "discharge duties fraught with such risks of injury to others that even a
momentary lapse of attention can have disastrous consequences." Id. at 628.
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with the interference with the privacy expected when urinating,
but reasoned that the Government sought to temper the
encroachment.'" Furthermore, the Court found no indication
that medical facts disclosed in the testing would not be treated as
confidential by the Government.1"
More crucial to the Court's evaluation of the extent of personal
intrusion was the employees' participation in an industry
comprehensively regulated to ensure the safety of rail
transportation.'" More specifically, the Court recognized that an
employee's mental and physical fitness are of central concern in
preventing potential calamity. 47 The Court reasoned that
employees' awareness of the correlation between fitness and safety
and the policy prohibiting drug and alcohol use combine to reduce
the legitimate expectation of privacy in information relating to an
employee's fitness for duty.'"
In National Treasury Employees Union v. von Raab,'" decided
the same day as Skinner, the Court addressed the issue of
whether mandatory urine testing by the United States Customs
Service (the "Service") of employees seeking reassignment or
promotion to certain positions violates the Fourth
Amendment. 5 ° The Court found that the Government has a
"compelling interest" in the physical fitness, judgment and
character of those charged with the duty of intercepting illegal
drug importation.'' The Court's decision was unique in that no
factual basis existed, nor was a serious claim made that a drug
problem existed in the Service. 52 The drug tests served as a
144. Id. at 626-27. Samples were not required to be provided under direct
observation, despite increased risk of tampering, and were collected in a medical
environment absent railroad personnel. Id.
145. Id. at 626 n.7.
146. Id. at 627. Cf New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (holding that
participants in closely regulated industries have a reduced expectation of privacy in
commercial property); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (holding that
dealers who engage in businesses subject to warrantless statutory searches have no
justifiable expectation of privacy in records or inventory that are the objects of
statutory regulation).
147. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 627. The Court found support for this conclusion in the
enactment of the Hours of Service Act of 1907. Id.
148. Id. at 628.
149. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
150. von Raab, 489 U.S. at 659. Von Raab, Commissioner of the Customs Service,
implemented the plan to test applicants to positions directly involved in drug
interdiction, requiring handling of firearms, and involving access to "classified"
material. Id. at 660.
151. Id. at 670. The Court considered that the nature of these positions ne-
cessitates all reasonable efforts to prevent bribery, misuse of seized contraband,
negligent discharge of firearms, and covert complicity with smugglers. Id. at 669-71.
152. Id. at 673.
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form of loyalty test aimed at weeding out an element potentially
subversive to the Service's mission.
153
The Vernonia decision cannot be adequately understood through
Fourth Amendment analysis alone. Indeed, the Court stressed
that its opinion of the constitutionality of the search in Vernonia
was significantly affected by the fact that it was imposed on school
children.'" Minor children have occupied a particular place in
constitutional jurisprudence. Much like adults, the content of the
rights possessed by children in our society has varied depending
on the relationship considered.
In In re Gault,"s the Court considered the habeas corpus
petition' of a fifteen-year-old boy ("Gault") who sought release
from a juvenile detention facility on the basis of the constitutional
infirmity of the proceedings by which he was committed as a
delinquent. 7 Gault was adjudicated delinquent based on an
allegation that he had made an obscene telephone call."5 In the
course of the proceedings, no formal notice was made to Gault's
parents of the nature of the charge against him."9 The hearing
itself was conducted informally with no record made."s The
complainant in the case did not appear at the hearing and the
finding that Gault made the objectionable phone call was based on
admissions that Gault had allegedly made.' Neither Gault nor
his parents were adequately apprised of their right to counsel or
153. Id. The Customs Service is the federal agency that oversees all persons,
freight, vehicles, and mail entering the United States and it collects tariffs and
enforces customs laws. Id. at 659-60.
154. Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2396-97.
155. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
156. Habeas corpus is a writ utilized to seek release from unlawful confinement.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 709 (6th ed. 1990).
157. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 3-4. Gault was committed in accordance with the
procedure embodied in the Arizona Juvenile Code for the duration of his minority
(until age 21) as a consequence of a determination that he had made a lewd telephone
call. Id. at 7-8. The juvenile court judge based the decision in part on the Arizona
Criminal Code and partly on an interpretation of a delinquent child as one who is
"habitually involved in immoral matters." Id. at 8-9. If convicted of the same offense
as an adult Gault would have been guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of
$5 to $50 or a prison term of up to two months. Id.
158. Id. at 7-8.
159. Id. at 5-6.
160. Id. Information as to what occurred in the proceedings was gathered from
the testimony of the presiding judge, Gault's parents, and a probation officer. Id.
161. Id. at 7. According to the Court, the evidence indicated that the juvenile
court judge based his finding of guilt on unrecorded statements made by Gault at two
separate hearings on the matter. Id. at 6-7. This finding appeared to be in conflict




the privilege against self-incrimination.162  No appeal was
provided for juvenile cases under Arizona law.1'
The Supreme Court of Arizona acknowledged that due process,
as required of the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment,
has to be observed in proceedings to determine whether a juvenile
should be committed to an institution.' The Arizona court
concluded that due process does not mandate that all the
constitutional procedural components of an adult criminal trial be
brought into juvenile proceedings, but rather requires that for
juveniles due process is embodied by the established practice of
the juvenile system.'65 The Court indicated that this decision
upheld the prevailing situation in practically all jurisdictions that
rights granted to adults were largely denied to juveniles." The
Court noted that this situation was historically justified by the
concept that juvenile proceedings were conducted not to affect the
liberty of the juvenile, but to establish custody, to which children
have a right.6 7
The Court heard In re Gault to determine what application, if
any, the Bill of Rights has in juvenile proceedings in which an
individual may be committed to a state institution." In In re
Gault, the Court explained that the concept of due process is
rooted in a respect for procedure and regularity.6 9 The peculiar
juvenile system, the Court explained, was founded on good
intentions, in which, theoretically, a benevolent judge determines
162. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 10.
163. Id. at 8. Thus, the Gault's sought review of the decision by a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus. Id.
164. In re Gault, 407 P.2d 760, 764-65 (Ariz. 1965), rev'd, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
165. In re Gault, 407 P.2d at 765.
166. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 14. This practice developed out of the philosophy
that spawned the creation of a separate juvenile court system in the United States
around the turn of the century. Id. at 14-15. According to the Court, the reformers
were motivated by a desire to rehabilitate juveniles because they were "convinced that
society's duty to the child could not be confined by the concept of justice alone." Id.
at 15. The reformers were dismayed by the common law system in which children con-
victed of crimes could be confined for long sentences in prisons housing hardened
criminals. Id. The reform philosophy regarded children as essentially good and in need
of the state's "care and solicitude." id.
167. Id. at 16-17 & n.21. The Court explained that the Bill of Rights has no role
in the process because the state was doing something of assistance for the children
from which they needed no protection. Id, A child's "guilt" is unimportant because the
system does not mete out punishment but, rather, treatment. Id. at 15-16.
168. Id. at 13-14. The basic rights sought to be obtained by the petition were
notice of the charges, the right to counsel, the right to confrontation and cross-
examination, the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to a transcript of the
proceedings, and the right to appellate review. Id. at 10.
169. Id. at 27-28. The Court lamented that under the Constitution the condition
of childhood does not justify a deprivation of liberty by a "kangaroo court." Id.
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what is in a juvenile's best interests.17 For the Court, this
demonstrated that "unbridled discretion" is a "poor substitute for
principle and procedure."'
The Court held that due process cannot be observed without
following certain fundamental elements of procedure embodied in
the Bill of Rights.'72 The Court held that juvenile proceedings in
which a minor's liberty is at stake cannot be held without
adequate advance notice of the facts at issue. 3 In addition, the
Court stated that proceedings carrying the possibility of lengthy
confinement in a state institution are comparable in seriousness
to a felony prosecution at which the assistance of counsel is
essential.74 Therefore, the Court held that juveniles and parents
must be informed of their right to be represented by an
attorney.175 Finally, the Court found that a judge's discretion is
an insufficient substitute for the right to confront and cross-
examine witnesses or the privilege against self-incrimination, 6
in fairly and accurately determining the facts at issue in a
juvenile proceeding. 7 The Court held that without a knowing,
170. Id. at 17-18.
171. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 17-18. The Court found that the realities of the
system often lead to a denial of fundamental due process. Id. at 19-20. The Court
quoted the Chairman of the Pennsylvania Council of Juvenile Court Judges as saying:
"Unfortunately, loose procedures, high-handed methods, and crowded court calendars,
either singly or in combination, all too often, have resulted in depriving some juveniles
of fundamental rights that have resulted in a denial of due process." Id. at 19 (citation
omitted).
172. Id. at 31-59. The Court stressed the importance of procedural due process
to the freedom of the individual, calling it the "basic and essential term in the social
compact" defining individual rights and limiting the powers of government. Id. at 20.
The Court quoted Justice Frankfurter as saying: "The history of American freedom is,
in no small measure, the history of procedure." Id. at 21 (quoting Malinsky v. New
York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1945) (holding that a conviction resting, in any part, on an
involuntary confession cannot be upheld)).
173. Id. at 33. This notice, the Court explained, must be timely enough to allow
adequate preparation for a hearing of the facts and must set forth with sufficient
particularity the misconduct charged. Id.
174. ld. at 36-37. According to the Court, assistance of counsel is needed to "cope
with problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist upon regularity
of the proceedings, and to ascertain whether he has a defense and to prepare and
submit it." Id. at 36.
175. ld. at 41.
176. This privilege is embodied in the Fifth Amendment, which states in pertinent
part: "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
177. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 43-57. The Court rejected the Arizona Supreme
Court's view that the privilege against self-incrimination is inappropriate for a juvenile
proceeding, remarking: "It would indeed be surprising if the privilege against self-
incrimination were available to hardened criminals but not to children." Id. at 47, 51.
The Arizona Supreme Court's view considered confession to be a therapeutic beginning
of the rehabilitative process, and encouraged juveniles to adopt an attitude of trust
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voluntary confession, a finding of delinquency could not be upheld
without the sworn testimony of witnesses who were subject to
cross-examination.178 The Court's recognition in In re Gault that
as against police action juveniles possess constitutional rights
akin to those of adults, has been significantly truncated when the
scope of those rights has been considered as against the authority
of public school officials.
In Goss v. Lopez,' the Supreme Court considered an appeal
from a judgment of a three-judge panel of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio that an Ohio
statute permitting disciplinary suspension of public school
students without some form of hearing was an unconstitutional
denial of due process."8 In considering the appeal, the Court
found that Ohio students possess a constitutionally protected
property right in an education by virtue of Ohio law."8' The
Court had little difficulty concluding that a deprivation of this
right, by temporary suspension, without an opportunity to
challenge its justification, is a denial of constitutional due
process.18' Having thus decided, the Court was left with the
more complicated question of what constitutes due process in a
school setting.
The Court declined to agree with school administrators that the
challenged deprivation was too trivial to warrant application of
and confidence toward juvenile officials. Id. at 51. The Court found that the basic
premise behind the privilege, that involuntary confessions are inherently suspect, is
at least equally important when dealing with juveniles as with adults. Id. at 52-55.
178. Id. at 57. The Court ruled that these requirements are constitutionally
mandated by the Sixth Amendment, which states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained
by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the Witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and the have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
179. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
180. Lopez v. Williams, 372 F. Supp. 1279 (S.D. Ohio 1973), afl'd sub nom. Goss
v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). The case arose out of ten 10-day suspensions of high
school students following in the wake of a period of widespread unrest in the
Columbus Public School System in early 1971. Goss, 419 U.S. at 569.
181. Goss, 419 U.S. at 573-74. The Ohio Revised Code directs local officials
to provide a free education to all residents between the ages of five and twenty-one.
OIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.48 (Anderson 1994).
182. Goss, 419 U.S. at 574-75. The Court found that these suspensions deprived
the students of a property interest in an education to which they are lawfully entitled
as well as a liberty interest in personal reputation which could have been harmed by
the presence of the suspensions in their school records. Id.
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the principles of due process."' On the other hand, the Court
recognized that imposing procedural safeguards akin to those
found in courtrooms might tax the disciplinary process and
eliminate the usefulness of suspensions in the educational
process."'4
The Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment requires school officials to notify a student of charges
and to afford the student an opportunity to present the facts as
viewed by the student.' In so holding, the Court indicated that
this requires no more formal a procedure than is appropriate in
an educational setting.
8 6
In New Jersey v. T.L.O., s7 the Court was confronted with a
dispute over the admission, in a juvenile proceeding, of evidence
seized by a school official in a search of a student's purse which
the New Jersey Supreme Court had previously found to be
unlawful.'88 The case came to the Court for determination of the
applicability of the exclusionary rule' in the context of a
183. Id. at 576.
184. Id. at 583. The Court considered the need for discipline and order in class-
rooms and the frequency of situations calling for corrective action by administrators.
Id. at 580. The Court, however, ruled that the evils of a system where school officials
could act unilaterally and unchallenged require the minimal assurance that a person
in danger of serious sanction has notice of the accusation and an opportunity to be
heard regarding it. Id.
185. Id. at 581. Cf. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (holding that school
officials need provide no prior procedural safeguards in employing corporal punishment
and that common law tort remedies provided an adequate safeguard against abuse).
186. Goss, 419 U.S. at 583. The Court stated that the hearing can follow
immediately after notice is given and that all that is required is that the student be
given a sufficient chance to address the accusations of misconduct. Id. at 582. The
Court stated that this serves to guard against the danger of unjustified deprivations
by alerting the official to the existence of a dispute so that the official may take steps
to satisfactorily ascertain the truth. Id. at 583-84. Furthermore, the Court did not deny
school officials the ability to summarily remove disruptive students, but allowed that
in some cases the opportunity to be heard could be provided soon after action was
taken. Id. at 582-83.
187. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
188. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 328-31. T.L.O., a fourteen-year-old high school freshman,
was observed smoking in a school lavatory in contravention of school rules. Id. at 328.
When brought before an Assistant Vice Principal, T.L.O. denied the infraction
whereupon the official demanded to search T.L.O.'s purse for cigarettes. Id. In the
course of the search, the Assistant Vice Principal discovered, in addition to cigarettes,
a small quantity of marijuana, smoking paraphernalia, and correspondence and
notations implicating T.L.O. as a marijuana peddler. Id. This discovery, along with
T.L.O.'s subsequent confession that she had in fact dealt marijuana, prompted the
state to institute delinquency proceedings. Id. at 328-29.
189. The exclusionary rule is an evidentiary rule which operates to exclude
evidence from criminal proceedings that is seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding that a state officer is
bound to respect a citizen's Fourth Amendment freedom and that evidence seized in
violation thereof must be excluded from a criminal proceeding).
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juvenile proceeding, but the Court ordered reargument of the
constitutionality of the search in order to reach the broader issue
of the limits the Fourth Amendment places on school authorities
regarding searches of students' personal papers and effects. 9 '
Preliminary to that inquiry, the Court affirmed that the Fourth
Amendment is in fact applicable to the actions of school
officials. 9 '
The Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment, and
particularly its probable cause prerequisite, were eschewed by the
Court as unsuited to the school setting.'92 School officials, the
Court stated, require a certain amount of latitude if discipline and
order are to be maintained in the classroom.'93 The fundamental
order of the Fourth Amendment, according to the Court, is that all
searches be reasonable.' The Court stated that what is
reasonable varies with the context of the search and is to be
determined by balancing the legitimate individual privacy
expectations'95 infringed by the search against the governmental
need served thereby.'96
Having declared that reasonableness is established when the
public interest in a search outweighs the interest of the individual
in freedom from personal intrusion, the Court proposed an inquiry
to guide the determination of the constitutionality of the search of
T.L.O.'s purse. 97 The first step in the test, the Court stated, is
190. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 331-32.
191. Id. at 333. In so doing, the Court rejected the argument that school officials
are not bound by the strictures of the Fourth Amendment because their authority to
act is, in essence, the delegated authority of the children's parents. Id. at 336. Because
compulsory education is mandated by state laws, the Court stated that actions by
school officials are in furtherance of the public policy embodied in those laws and are
undertaken on behalf of the state. Id. School officials' roles are representative of the
state and therefore, the Court reasoned, school officials cannot claim parental authority
as a shield to the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 336-37.
192. Id. at 340-41. The Court, in elaborating on the standard to displace probable
cause, declined to decide whether any "individualized suspicion" is necessary to justify
a search by school officials. Id. at 341-42. The Court intimated that there are
situations in which a search would be justifiable without regard to any discernible
element of suspicion. id. at 342 n.8.
193. Id. at 339-40.
194. Id. at 340. Accord Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (holding that
a warrant is not required prior to conducting a search in situations where such a
requirement would be unworkable).
195. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337. The Court expressly affirmed that students do not
waive all privacy rights in their persons and personal effects by their mere presence
in school. Id. at 338-39. Cf Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (holding that inmates
of a federal detention center have no expectation of privacy in their cells and
belongings that society recognizes as legitimate).
196. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337.
197. Id. at 341-42. The Court borrowed this test from its seminal decision in
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17-20 (1968) (holding that a "hands-on" search of an
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to determine if, when the search was instituted, the official
performing it possessed reason to think the search would produce
evidence of an infraction of the law or school policy.'98 Second,
the Court explained, the conduct of the search must comport in
scope to its objective and not impinge further on the privacy of the
student than the circumstances warrant.'"
It is not surprising that Vernonia is one in a growing list of
cases in which the Court has eliminated suspicion of an individual
in favor of a more flexible "reasonableness" standard. Supreme
Court decisions considering the scope of constitutional rights of
school students have consistently been tailored to accord much
deference to the need of public school administrators to maintain
order and discipline in classrooms. The approval of this broad,
suspicionless search in the school context was not dictated by the
Court's decision in T.L.O. In T.L.O. the school official possessed
grounds for a particular suspicion that gave rise to the search."°e
There is dicta in T.L.O. intimating that the quantum of suspicion
possessed by the school administrator was not necessarily a
constitutional minimum.'' However, the fact that grounds to
suspect T.L.O. were present undermines an argument that the
case stands as authority for the generalized blanket search
conducted by the Vernonia School District.
The decision in Vernonia fell within a broader pattern of
Supreme Court decisions in which well-established interpretations
of the Fourth Amendment have been eschewed as unsuitable. The
Court's decisions recognizing exceptions to the probable cause
standard have generally occurred outside of criminal law
investigatory suspect is constitutionally reasonable if the "action was justified at its
inception," and "was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified
the interference in the first place."). The justification varies, however, in that the Terry
decision rested on a police officer's concern for personal safety. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
In T.L.O., the search was calculated to produce evidence to discredit a student
suspected of violating school rules. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 328.
198. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341-42. The Court concluded that the observations of the
teacher formed a sufficient basis of suspicion to justify a search of T.L.O.'s purse for
cigarettes. Id. at 345-46. Because merely opening and removing a pack of cigarettes
is constitutionally acceptable, the Court deemed the incidental discovery of rolling
papers inside a reasonable basis to cause the Assistant Vice Principal to suspect the
student of marijuana possession. Id, at 346-47. The Court found that the thorough
rummaging through the contents of the purse and perusal of T.L.O.'s personal papers
was justified to confirm the Assistant Vice Principal's suspicion. Id. at 347.
199. Id. at 341, 347. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan derided this test
as having no fixed content save that it was not probable cause, and that it was "Ror-
schach-like," implying that a court employing it could find any search reasonable based
on a judge's personal predilections. Id. at 355, 357-58 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
200. 1I. at 328, 346-47.
201. Id. at 342 n.8.
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enforcement, the traditional concern of the Amendment."2 The
Court has often viewed searches in the narrow context of the
affected private citizen's relationship to the state and pronounced
a more specific rule for what was "reasonable" in the situation.
Throughout most of our constitutional history, broad
suspicionless searches were unquestionably determined to be
violative of the Fourth Amendment.20 3 Blanket searches which
subject a whole class of individuals to government scrutiny have
been increasingly evaluated with regard to their potential
effectiveness instead of their consistency with the concept of
probable cause. In the process, the Court appears to be
abandoning a requirement that an important enforcement goal be
frustrated by the probable cause standard. The Court found the
concept of cause inapplicable to the District's Policy in that the
procedure was one not contemplated by the Framers of the Fourth
Amendment. This characterization is disingenuous in that it
implies that the Framers did not perceive that government
searches could be employed in a broad and efficient manner.
The Court's treatment of suspicionless testing as a "level
alternative" to a suspicion-based regime presupposed no
constitutional value inherent in a requirement of cause. In
reasoning so, the Court undercut the principle of Acton's objection
to the Policy.2  Without cause, one simply expects not to be
searched bodily by the authority of the state. It was an affront to
require Acton to prove his incorruption, his freedom from the
blight present in Vernonia's schools, as a condition to sharing in
the rewards of athletic competition."
The Court has approved this practice before and it was perhaps
more understandable upon consideration of the value of blanket
searches as a deterrent without criminal sanction. In the criminal
202. But cf Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 872 (1987) (search produced a
felony conviction); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 693 (1987) (owner of property
searched charged with possession of stolen property).
203. Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2398 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
204. Justice Brandeis, in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 430 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting), expressed a similar viewpoint when he wrote:
[The Framers of the Constitution] conferred, as against the government, the
right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men. To protect, that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by
the government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means
employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (holding that the interception of conversations through
wiretapping is not a search or seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment)
(emphasis added).
205. According to Justice Brandeis: -'he greatest dangers to liberty lurk in
insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding."
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 479 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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realm resistance to judicially created substitutes for the warrant
and probable cause requirements is stiffer because the
consequences are the ultimate deprivation of freedom itself.
The Vernonia decision is an illustration of the inadequacy of the
Court's balancing test to preserve the Fourth Amendment rights
of individuals. The Court merely has to remove some of the weight
that belongs to individuals according to the perceived social value
of the governmental license taken. For example, the Court
considered drug testing to be consistent with the District's
practice of subjecting students to physical examinations and
vaccinations. In so doing, the Court ignored the obvious
implication that drug testing creates as to the trustworthiness of
the individuals. The Court justified its correlation by emphasizing
the "prophylactic" purpose of the search, "protecting student
athletes from injury and deterring drug use in the student
population,""° and ignored the social and physical benefits that
students were deprived for violation of the Policy. The Court
further presumed that the indignity of forced urination upon
compulsion, under the watchful eye of school authorities, is
negligibly different than using public restrooms. Underlying the
history of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has been a sense that
its freedoms carry a price for society. The test employed to
determine the reasonableness of the searches conducted by the
District allows that price to be avoided by depriving a large
number of innocent individuals of substantial constitutional
rights.
As a result of the broad applicability of the Court's decision,
millions of school children in the United States are currently free
from mandatory production of bodily fluids for governmental
inspection only by virtue of administrative discretion. It is
regrettable that this compromise of constitutional principle is
visited upon an impressionable and idealistic segment of the
citizenry."0 7 In so doing, the Court risked a concomitant erosion
of the belief in the primacy of individual liberty in our society."re
206. Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2393 n.2.
207. As Justice Jackson stated: "That [school officials] are educating the young
for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the
individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth not
to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes." West Virginia
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) (holding that a resolution of the
West Virginia Board of Education that required all students to salute the flag of the
United States was a violation of the First Amendment).
208. See von Raab, 489 U.S. at 687 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In von Raab, Justice
Scalia stated: "'Those who lose . . . are not just the Customs Service employees, whose
dignity is thus offended, but all ... who become subject to the administration of
federal officials whose respect for our privacy can hardly be greater than the small
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Viewing Vernonia within the context of the Court's decisions
pertaining to public school administration, the case detracts
considerably from former Justice Fortas' observation that
"students [do not] shed their constitutional rights... at the
schoolhouse gates."2  Viewed, however, from the perspective of
its balancing of comparative interests for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment, it serves to illustrate the inadequate and shifting
nature of the standard it advances. The test stands mutable. What
the Court considers to be reasonable appears to beget the values
assigned in the balancing equation. The primary usefulness of a
balancing approach to Fourth Amendment rights is in overcoming
absolute individual liberties to serve the moral judgment of those
in office or of popular consensus. The test is a tool used to
empower the government to exceed a constitutional absolute in
the interest of greater control over perceived crises. The broad
applicability of the governmental policies advanced, however,
gives this judicial exception the potential to swallow a large
portion of the Fourth Amendment's sphere of protection.
Cornelius J. O'Brien
respect they have been taught to have for their own." Id.
209. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)
(holding that school officials must respect students' rights to free speech as long as the
exercise of the rights does not seriously interrupt school order).
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